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 In many respects it is fair to say that the
Icelandic economy came of age in the 1990s.
At the beginning of the decade a crucial
victory was won in the battle against the high
inflation that plagued Iceland in the 1970s
and 1980s. After 1990, a 2–3% rate of
inflation became the norm compared to
30–60% in earlier years. Also, in the 1990s,
the policy of repeated currency devaluations
was shelved and more sensible policy measures
adopted. In 1993, Iceland became a part of
the European Economic Area (EEA), which
opened the economy up to a free flow of
labour, goods, services, and capital from
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This paper presents generational accounts for Iceland over the period 1994–1998. A longer
analysis period allows us to assess whether the economic boom during the latter part of the
1990s was more favourable to current- or future generations. We find that the restrictive
government policy of the period moved the economy towards intergenerational equality.
We also examine the generational impact of a resource tax for the exploitation of the
Icelandic fishing grounds, using the revenue to cover the government’s unfunded pension
liabilities. Finally, we employ Monte Carlo analysis to assess the sensitivity of the accounts
to changes in the discount- and growth rate.  JEL Classification: C1, E6, H6Europe. Important reforms in the financial
markets were implemented, and when long-
and short term capital movements were fully
liberalized in 1995 the Icelandic economy
went through a structural change. Another
significant development was the increased
diversity of the Icelandic export industries,
which reduced the dependency on the fishing
industry.
The latter part of the 1990s was a period
of high growth and economic prosperity.
Government revenue (as a ratio of GDP) grew
considerably, parallel to an actual decrease in
government expenditure. The fiscal policy
aimed at preserving economic stability and as
of 1997 the budget of the central government
was run with a surplus. At the beginning of a
new millennium there are some signs that the
economy is slowing down. The currency has
depreciated and inflation has increased. Also,
the current account deficit has been widening.
This paper uses generational accounts to
examine the impact of recent fiscal policy and
economic conditions on current- and future
generations in Iceland.  The first generational
accounting study in Iceland was conducted
in 1997 by the Institute of Economic Studies
(IoES, 1997a) for the base year 1995. Since
then, the IoES has published accounts for the
base years 1994, 1996, 1997 and 1998 (IoES,
2000). Unlike the previous studies, the
methodology developed in a European
Commission study on generational account-
ing in Europe (EU, 1999), detailed in the
paper by Raffelhüschen (2001) in this
volume, is applied here. 
The paper consists of three main parts.
The first gives an overview of the Icelandic
economy in a historical sense and of recent
economic developments. We also discuss
main trends in Icelandic fiscal policy over the
years, focusing on the changes in government
revenue and expenditures during the latter
part of the 1990s. The second part presents
Icelandic generational accounts for the base
years 1994 to 1998. We start with a brief
description of the main assumptions behind
the Icelandic accounts. We then examine the
development of the accounts between 1994
and 1998 in light of the economic conditions
and fiscal policy of the period. Some baseline
results concerning the distribution of the net
tax burden of current generations are
presented and finally we examine the impact
of imposing a resource tax on the exploitation
of the Icelandic fishing grounds.  The third
part of the paper contains a sensitivity
analysis, using Monte Carlo methods to asses
how the accounts react to changes in the
discount- and growth rate.
Economic Conditions and Fiscal
Policy in Past and Present
The Icelandic Economy
Iceland is a small open economy in the middle
of the Atlantic ocean, separated from the
markets on the mainland. Although the ocean
contributes to the isolation of the country it
also contains its main source of income, the
rich fishing grounds. Through the years, the
fishing industry has produced a large propor-
tion of the economy’s export revenue and
made up roughly 56% of total exports of
goods and services at the end of the 1980s.
However, the fishing industry is subject to
great uncertainty. The stock size, which
determines the yearly catch quota, is affected
by external biological factors such as sea
temperature and plankton supply. The fish
price on foreign markets is determined by
several factors, such as the size of the fishing
stock of other Atlantic fishing nations that
supply the same markets and world fish prices
in general.  Due to the importance of the
fishing industry, a close connection can be
observed between the value of the yearly catch
and GDP growth in the past. This largely
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been more pronounced in Iceland than in
most other industrialized countries. During
the 1990s, the economy became somewhat
less dependent on the fishing industry and in
1999 the share of the fishing industry in total
exports of goods and services was down to
45%.  This is mainly due to a greater variety
of the Icelandic industries, e.g. the
development of power-intensive industries,
tourism, and high-tech industries.  Obviously,
the fishing industry is still extremely impor-
tant for the Icelandic economy, although a
lessened dependence should reduce the
volatility of the business cycle.
The relationship between GDP growth
and revenue in the fishing industry
contributed to the belief that the best way to
stabilize the economy was to stabilize the
fishing industry through a variable nominal
exchange rate. The period between 1960 and
1990 was characterized by frequent currency
devaluations.  In 1988, when the catch quota
was decreased and market conditions were
unfavorable, the currency was devalued three
times.
Through the 1970s and 1980s, inflation
was perceived by the public and politicians
alike to be the main challenge. Before loan
indexation was introduced by law in 1979,
inflation had caused great transfers of wealth.
During this period, inflation played the part
of a negotiator in the labour market,
employers agreed to high nominal wage
increases which soon were nullified by
devaluation and price increases. At the end of
the 1980s it was clear that the soft exchange
policy could not be sustained. Inflation
during this decade was very high, amounting
to three digits in 1983. In 1990, a systematic
approach was used for the first time to battle
inflation. It consisted of a sort of a national
consensus, employees agreed to low nominal
wage increases, the government fixed the
exchange rate to a nominal anchor and the
banks promised to lower interest rates. This
worked to decrease inflation, which stayed
low throughout the 1990’s.
Compared to the turbulence of the 1970s
and 1980s, the 1990s were a period of relative
economic stability. After a period of
stagnation early in the decade, the Icelandic
economy prospered. The year 1994 marks the
beginning of the longest standing period of
high growth in Icelandic economic history,
which still has not ended. In 1997, the central
government budget was run with a surplus
for the first time since 1984, which has been
sustained from then on. The professed aim of
central government has been to run a contr-
active policy and try to ensure a soft landing
of the economy after the high growth of recent
years. The central government has paid down
debt and aims at a zero net debt in
2003–2004. Also, efforts have been made to
reduce government involvement in the
economy by privatization. At the beginning
of a new millennium, the economic boom is
still on, although warning signs can be
observed, such as a depreciating exchange
rate, rising inflation, and a large current
account deficit. 
Fiscal Policy and Government Budget
International economic bodies report a
significant increase in the size and scope of
the public sector in the last decades for most
of the industrialized countries. Although
there is no formal way to measure the size of
the public sector, an estimate is often obtained
by looking at some key figures, such as govern-
ment revenue and expenditures as a ratio of
GDP, or government employees as a ratio of
the total work force. Such figures show that
the public sector in Iceland is smaller than in
most other Northern-European countries.
However, the composition of government
expenditures has evolved along similar lines.
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welfare states is allocated to education, social
and welfare affairs, and the principal problems
are connected to budget deficits and growing
government debt.
When trends in the expenditures and
receipts of the Icelandic government are
examined, a considerable growth of the public
sector is apparent. In 1970, total government
revenue amounted to 30.1% of GDP
compared to 37.4% in 1998.
1 At the same
time, total expenditures grew from 28.9% in
1970 to 36.9% in 1998. The increase in
expenditures from 1970 was to a large extent
driven by growth in social transfers. The ratio
of social transfers to GDP rose from 16.5%
in 1970 to 23.8% in 1998. This increase is
mainly due to a large increase in health-care
expenditures, which more than doubled its
share of GDP during this period, and also to
increases in expenditures on primary and
secondary education, social and welfare
affairs, as well as to a changing age structure
of the population. Finally, there has been a
remarkable increase in interest expenditures
which went from 0.6% of GDP in 1970 to
3.6% in 1998.
During the 1970s and the first years of the
1980s the budget was run with small surpluses
most of the time. A long succession of deficits
followed, but from 1997 onwards the budget
has been run with surpluses. During six of
these years the deficit was 2–3% of GDP and
for four years it was 4–5% of GDP.  The
balance in public finances in this period is
more or less reflected by the change in the net
debt of general government, which rose from
5.8% of GDP in 1984 to 37.1% in 1997. In
the 1990s, special efforts were made to fight
the budget deficits and growing expenditures
and together with a favorable economic
environment, fiscal policy has succeeded to
turn the budget into a markable surplus in
recent years. A look at a more recent period
shows that total government expenditure
actually decreased between 1994 and 1998,
from 40.0 to 36.9% of GDP, while total
revenue grew from 35.2 to 37.4% of GDP in
the same period. The proclaimed policy of
central government in recent years has been
to use the budget surplus to reduce its debts,
both the general debt and its unfunded
pension liabilities. The objective is to
eliminate the general net debt of the central
government before the end of 2003 or 2004.
These efforts have resulted in the lowering of
the general net debt of the government from
37.1% to 30.8% of GDP between 1997 and
1998. However, the unfunded pension
liabilities of the government have increased
greatly at the same time. Increased pension
liabilities result from changes in the wage
system of the central government which took
place in 1997/1998. Recent wage contracts
with primary and secondary school teachers
are estimated to increase the pension
commitments of central government by 19
billion ISK, or around 2.8% of GDP.
The Icelandic Accounts 1994 to 1998
Assumptions and Data
The sources of the Icelandic data are
thoroughly covered in earlier work on
generational accounting in Iceland, where the
estimation of initial government debt and
government consumption is also detailed. 
There are, however, some aspects of the
Icelandic accounts that require a further
discussion here. The first concerns the quality
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1.  The figures in this section are obtained from the National Economic Institute, see National Economic Institute
(1999) and National Economic Institute (1998b), also available at www.ths.isof the Icelandic data. One of the advantages
of a small economy is that data in Iceland is
relatively readily available. For example, real
payments in the social security system and in
most of the direct tax groups were used to
construct the micro profiles. This is not an
option in many countries and should enhance
the reliability of the Icelandic generational
accounts. A high percentage of government
revenue can be distributed by age and gender,
between 90 and 92%, while only 46 to 56%
of government expenditures can be thus
divided, due to the non age-specific nature of
a large part of government expenditures.
The Icelandic accounts rely on a
population forecast by the IoES (IoES, 2001).
The projections start in 1999 and reach
through to 2050. From then on the popula-
tion is assumed to remain unchanged.
According to UN fertility data, Iceland had
the third highest fertility rate in Europe in
1995, only surpassed by Albania and
Macedonia. However, the total fertility rate
in Iceland has been slowly decreasing during
the last two decades, from 2.48 in 1980 down
to 1.99 in 1999. The projections assume that
the fertility rate continues to decrease, reaches
1.9 in 2015 and stays constant from then on.
As the forecast assumes mortality to decrease
during the next 20 years, life expectancy at
birth increases from 76.29 to 79.20 years for
males, and from 80.77 to 83.81 years for
females. Moreover, zero net migration is
assumed as net migration has fluctuated
around the zero point in the past. According
to the forecast, total population in Iceland
will reach a maximum of 330 thousand in
2038 and then decline to 327 thousand in
2050.
Like in other European countries, there is
an aging process going on in Iceland.
However, as the fertility rate is still quite high,
the aging process starts rather late. The old
age dependency ratio
2 in 1995 was about
29%, and according to our projections it will
be around 36% in 2015. The old age
dependency ratio increases more rapidly
during the next decades, to 52% in 2035 and
to 57% in 2055, with almost three out of
every five classified as elderly.
Generational accounts assume govern-
ment revenue and expenditure to increase at
the rate of GDP growth.
3 Unless otherwise
mentioned, we use a 1.5% growth rate as a
base case, a standard assumption in the
generational accounts of most countries.
Also, we use a 6% discount rate to calculate
the present value of payments made in the
future. This is a higher interest rate than is
commonly used in most other countries. The
reason is a high risk-premium due to the
smallness of the country and its dependence
on a volatile natural resource.
Development of the Accounts
Generational accounts are reliant on the
business cycle, as well as on the fiscal policy.
An economic boom increases the income of
households and firms and provides the
government with increased tax revenue. The
allocation of the extra income by the
government then determines whether or not
the result will be a decrease in the inter-
generational imbalance.
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2.  The old age dependency ratio is calculated as the ratio of people aged 60+ to those aged 20–59. This ratio should
perhaps be calculated differently in Iceland, as the effective retirement age is between 65 and 70 years of age.
The ratio of individuals aged 65+ to those aged 20–64 in Iceland was 20% in 1999, 23% in 2015, 36% in 2035
and around 40% in 2055.
3.  Social benefits in Iceland are neither indexed by wages or the cost of living. All increases are made in increments
determined by the government.As mentioned earlier, the Icelandic
accounts have been constructed for the period
1994 to 1998.  It is instructive to examine the
development of the intergenerational
imbalance in the context of the economic
conditions and government policy in Iceland
during this period. Table 1 reports the
intertemporal public liabilities (IPL)
4 and the
explicit- and implicit debt of the government
as a ratio of GDP for the five base years.
5
We note that the IPL decreases throughout
the period and in 1998 there are even small
intertemporal public assets. Clearly, genera-
tional accounts based on the years 1994 and
1998 tell a very different story. Accounts for
the base year 1994 indicate that the fiscal
policy of that year is unsustainable and that
taxes on future generations must be raised in
order to fulfill the government’s intertemporal
budget constraint. On the other hand,
accounts based on 1998 suggest a sustainable
policy and even allow for a small cut in the
taxes of future generations.
Table 1 also shows that the decrease in the
IPL is mainly due to a fall in the implicit debt,
which turns into implicit assets in 1996. The
changes in the implicit debt between 1994
and 1998 can largely be traced to the business
cycle. During this period, economic
conditions were particularly favourable and
government revenue rose from 35.2% to
37.4% of GDP. However, it must be observed
that the ratio of government expenditure to
GDP decreased from 40.0 to 36.9% between
1994 and 1998. The fall in the implicit debt
can thus also be attributed to a restrictive fiscal
policy.
The explicit debt decreased from 42 to
39% of GDP between 1994 and 1998.
Although this decrease in the explicit debt has
a negligible effect on the IPL when compared
to the change in the implicit debt, it again
indicates a contractive fiscal policy. It can thus
be said that the Icelandic government ran a
policy favourable to future generations in the
period 1994–1998.
From our brief overview of recent
developments in Icelandic economic condi-
tions in an earlier section, it is clear that the
years 1994 to 1998 were particularly pro-
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4.  Intertemporal public liabilities indicate how far short the government falls of fulfilling the intertemporal bud-
get constraint, given a continuation of current fiscal policy. Positive IPL imply an unsustainable fiscal policy.
The IPL are made up of explicit- and implicit debt. Explicit debt is government debt in the base year, estimat-
ed from official statistics (for the estimation of initial government debt, see IoES (2000)). Implicit debt is the
debt that will be accumulated by future net tax payments of current- and future generations. IPL = explicit debt
+ implicit debt. See Raffelhüschen (2001) in this volume for a detailed discussion.
5.  The exchange rate used is the average one year ask price; 82.72, 83.61, 83.26, 79,96 and 79.60 ISK/ECU in
the years 1994 to 1998, respectively.
Table 1.
Development of the Intergenerational Imbalance
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Explicit debt (% of GDP) 42 44 43 40  39
Implicit debt (% of GDP) 78  28  -6  -40 -55 
IPL (% of GDP) 120  72 38  0  -16 sperous. An obvious question is therefore
whether the generational imbalance is likely
to turn again as soon as the business cycle
takes a downward turn. Figure 1 strongly
suggests that the prosperity of this period was
not entirely due to the business cycle. The
figure displays the real budget performance
of the central government as well as the
structural budget performance
6, which equals
the real budget performance when the
business cycle has been corrected for, for the
period 1990 to 2000.
In the beginning of the 1990s, the central
government was run with a deficit.  However,
this deficit has been declining since 1994 and
from 1997 on there has been a budget surplus.
It is natural to connect the improved position
of government finances to increased business
in the economy. However, the structural
budget performance indicates that the
improvement cannot solely be traced to the
business cycle, it also seems that a real change
has occurred in the running of the treasury.
This implies that some of the changes in the
Icelandic economic conditions during the
period should be permanent, even if the
business cycle swings downwards.
Baseline Results
Table 2 reports the generational accounts of
all living cohorts
7, newborns to 90 years and
older for the base year 1998. The first column
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6.  Calculated following standard OECD procedures.
7.  Here, government consumption is included as a non-age-specific expenditure, according to the methodology
proposed in EU (1999).
Figure 1.
Budget Performance and Structural Budget performance 1990–2000reports the combined net tax burden of males
and females, while the other two display the
gender specific accounts. 
We note that the average newborn has a
significantly negative net tax burden, receives
around 71 thousand ECU net of taxes over
his lifetime. The accounts stay negative until
the age of 12, when they turn positive due a
lower discounting of future taxes. The net tax
burden increases steadily with age until it
reaches a peak at the age of 31 when the net
tax is around 140 thousand ECU.  From then
onwards the accounts decrease and turn
negative again at the age of 58.  At this point,
future pension receipts, health care benefits
etc. outweigh the taxes that remain to be paid.
The lifetime net transfer receipts reach their
maximum at the age of 74 years and gradually
decrease from then on due to a shorter life
expectancy. As a result, a typical life-cycle
pattern can be observed.  Cohorts aged 12–57
face positive tax burdens, i.e. on average
Icelanders are net taxpayers for around 46
years of their lives. All other living generations
receive net transfers in present value terms.
As is apparent from Table 2, the gender-
specific differences in net tax burdens are
large. While the average newborn male
receives a net transfer of 35 thousand ECUs
over his lifetime, an average female receives
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Table 2.
Distribution of the Lifetime Net Tax Burden
Generation’s (1000 ECU*)   
age in 199 Average Male Female
0 -71.4 -34.9 -109.1
5 -53.2 -9.5 -97.0
10 -13.9 37.5 -69.8
15 35.6 106.1 -36.2
20 74.6 153.4  -5.6
25 116.6 204.2 23.5
30 134.6 224.0  41.8
35 132.6 216.3  48.5
40 126.9 206.7  47.8
45 103.0 171.3  30.6
50 66.3 132.1  1.6
55 24.7 81.8 -31.2
60 -21.7 27.4 -71.3
65 -69.4 -30.5 -105.4
70 -102.0 -72.1 -129.8
75 -110.8 -85.7 -130.7
80 -112.8 -90.1 -128.8
85 -110.7 -88.7 -124.2
90 -22.3 -19.9  -23.5
Increase in all taxes, future (%)        -10.6  -  -
Future generational account        83.2  -50.9  -116.9
Absolute difference -11.8  -16.0  -7.8
IPL (% of GDP}       -16.0  -  -    109 thousand ECUs. One of the reasons is
that children’s benefits are usually paid to the
mothers, while some taxes, such as property
taxes, are more often connected to the men.
However, the major reason is that on average,
women receive lower wages and thus pay
lower taxes. 
The government’s intertemporal public
liabilities are negative for the base year 1998
as can be seen in Table 2. The surplus in the
government’s intertemporal budget con-
straint generated by the continuation of
present fiscal policy is about 16% of GDP.
This means that future generations will
receive a bonus, despite the explicit debt of
39% of GDP.  Therefore, all taxes of future
cohorts can be reduced by 10.6
8. This means
that future newborns can expect to pay ECU
11.800 less than the 1998 generation, on
average.
The above accounts are not inter-
generationally balanced.  In order to ensure
equality between current- and future genera-
tions, an immediate tax reduction of 1.46%
or increase in transfers by 1.74% would
suffice.
Instigation of a Fishing permit Fee
The fishing industry in Iceland has undergone
considerable changes in the last decades.
Following the expansion of the territorial
waters to 200 nautical miles in 1975, the
fishing grounds were exploited without
consideration for the stock size. In 1984, the
fisheries management system of total
allowable catches and individual transferable
quotas was introduced to control the exploi-
tation of the resource. As such, the system has
proved its worth. However, some of its factors
have received increased criticism in recent
years. This especially applies to the right to
transfer the quota to a third party, i.e. to profit
from selling a share in a national resource that
was allocated free to them in the beginning.
In recent years, the discussion on whether
to collect a fee for the exploitation of national
resources, the fishing grounds in particular,
has been prominent in the national debate.
In order to propose some solutions, a
committee was established and published a
report in September 2000 where it recom-
mends that all natural resources should be
declared a property of the nation and a fee
collected for their utilization.
The question is, how would the proceeds
of a tax for the exploitation of the Icelandic
fishing grounds, a so-called fishing permit fee
(FPF), be spent. As the tax would be collected
for the utilization of a national property, the
proceeds should be used for the benefit of the
nation as a whole. The idea here is to establish
a generational fund to cover the unfunded
pension liabilities of the government, which
have grown considerably in the 1990s.
9
Clearly, the instigation of a FPF will
involve redistribution of wealth, as only the
owners of the fisheries will be subject to the
tax. As such, it is interesting from the point
of view of generational accounting. Table 3
reports the results of a policy experiment
where a yearly FPF, sufficient to cover the
government’s pension liabilities, is imple-
mented. The revenue from the FPF is
distributed by age and gender using the
distribution of stock ownership. This is only
a rough approximation, as a large part of firms
in the fishing industry is in private ownership.
Also, firms in the fishing industry are only 17
out of the 73 enterprises and funds on the
Iceland Stock Exchange. The first two
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8.  We talk about changes in taxes and transfers as a percentage of total taxes or transfers.
9.  This idea originates with Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson, IoES.columns of Table 3 show the government’s
pension liabilities and the yearly FPF needed
to cover them, for the base years 1994 to 1998.
The next two columns report the IPL before
and after the implementation of the FPF. The
final column displays the tax adjustment
needed in addition to the FPF to achieve
generational balance.
The first point we note is that the FPF
needed each year to cover the government’s
pension liabilities is very high, or between 9.1
and 10.4% of GDP. If implemented at all,
the FPF would never be this high, 1% of GDP
would be a more realistic figure. Another
point of interest is that the FPF could actually
increase the intergenerational imbalance
according to the 1997 and 1998 accounts.
Additional policy changes would be needed
to achieve generational balance. For the 1998
accounts, taxes on current and future
generations would have to be decreased by
4.84% to reach intergenerational equality.
Monte Carlo Sensitivity Analysis
As has been extensively documented in the
generational accounting literature, the
accounts are particularly sensitive to the
choice of discount- and growth rate. More-
over, the accounts do not always behave in an
a priori specified manner when those
parameters are altered. Therefore, some sort
of a sensitivity analysis is necessary.
Frequently, the sensitivity of the accounts
is assessed by computing the results for a few
different values of the discount- and growth
rate, like we do in Table 4.  However, while
such experiments indeed reveal that the choice
of those parameters greatly affects the
outcome of the accounts, they are lacking in
other respects. Most importantly, they do not
reveal how key elements of the accounts move
with the discount- or growth rate. As we will
see later the IPL, for example, can be
decreasing over some intervals of the growth-
or discount rate and increasing over others.
Therefore, these experiments do not usually
reveal whether or not the accounts behave
unexpectedly for any specific values of the
discount- or growth rate. Furthermore, such
a sensitivity analysis does not contribute
much to the understanding and inter-
pretation of the generational accounting
model, of how and why the accounts react to
changes in the discount- and growth rate.
In this paper, we use Monte Carlo analysis
to assess the sensitivity of the generational
accounts to changes in the discount- and
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Table 3.
Results of Fishing permit Fee Experiment
Base Pension Fishing IPL baseline IPL with FPF % Tax
year liabilities* permit fee* (% of GDP)} (% of GDP) change**
1994 1,158  49 120  91  9.71
1995 1,187  50  71  43  4.49
1996 1,305 55  37  9  0.90
1997 1,420  60  0  -28  -2.98
1998 1,810  77  -16  -47  -4.84
* 1,000,000 ECU, each years value
** Tax change needed to reach intergenerational balance after implementation of FPFgrowth rate, the first time employed in this
context to our knowledge. This approach
involves repeated computations of the
generational accounts, each time using a
different, random discount- and growth rate.
The Monte Carlo experiment presented here
is based on 1998 data. The analysis looks at
three important elements of the accounts, the
net tax burden of the generation born in the
base year, the net tax burden of future
generations and the IPL. The following
discussion has two focus points. First, how
the IPL and the tax burden of current and
future generations move with the discount-
and growth rate. Second, how sensitive the
accounts are in an interval close to our base
case of a 1.5% growth rate and a 6% discount
rate.
An important factor of the generational
accounting model should be mentioned. If
the model is closely examined, we note that
the growth- or discount rate on their own do
not determine the outcome of the accounts,
rather the ratio between the two parameters,
1+g
1+r , hereafter the gr-ratio. We note in
particular that two different values of the
discount- and growth rate yield the same
generational accounts if the gr-ratio is the
same in both cases. We took advantage of this
property when conducting the Monte Carlo
experiments.
The accounts were calculated for 10,000
different values of the gr-ratio, drawn from a
random uniform distribution between 0.86
and 0.99.
10This interval of the gr-ratio should
contain all viable (and some not so viable)
combinations of the discount- and growth
rate
11
We start by examining the relationship
between the gr-ratio and the IPL. This is
clearly displayed in Figure 2, a scatter diagram
where the gr-ratio is plotted on the left y-axis
against the corresponding IPL on the right y-
axis. The experiments are ordered by the gr-
ratio.  We note that as the gr-ratio increases
(which is equivalent to an increase in the
growth rate or a decrease in the discount rate),
the IPL initially decreases slowly. However,
when the gr-ratio approaches 1, the IPL starts
decreasing rapidly and it is clear that the IPL
is very sensitive when the growth rate
approaches the discount rate. The reason is
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10. The value 0.86 of the gr-ratio corresponds e.g. to a 1.5% growth rate and an 18% discount rate, or a 5% growth
rate and a 22% discount rate. The value 0.99 is obtained when the growth rate is almost equal to the discount
rate.
11. Note, that generational accounting does not allow the growth rate to be greater than or equal to the discount
rate. This would imply a dynamically inefficient situation where the government could allow debt to increase
indefinitely, as income would grow at a higher rate than the interest payments.
Table 4.
Sensitivity Analysis, 1998 Accounts
Growth rate 1% 1.5% 2%
Discount rate 4%  6% 8%  4% 6% 8% 4% 6% 8%
Current generations (1,000 ECU)  -59  -73  -74   -52  -71  -75   -43  -68  -75
Future generations (1,000 ECU)  -76  -83  -72  -69  -83  -76   -61  -82  -79
IPL (% GDP)  -34  -11 2 -43  -16  -1   -56  -21  4that when the interest rate is almost equal to
the growth rate, the present value of payments
made by generations born in the distant future
is little less (in absolute value) than the value
of payments made today. As time does thus
hardly affect the present value of future
payments when the growth rate is close to the
discount rate, the absolute value of total net
tax payments of future generations will
approach infinity as the growth rate
approaches the discount rate.
We have marked a few points in the figure.
The points marked with a square corresponds
to the base case of the accounts with a 6%
discount rate and 1.5% growth rate. In this
point, the IPL is – 16% of GDP. The points
that are marked by a star represent a 4 and 8%
discount rate and a 1.5% growth rate and the
IPL in these points is –43% and 1% of GDP,
respectively. By moving from a 6% to an 8%
discount rate the intertemporal public assets
change into intertemporal public liabilities.
Figure 3 displays how the tax burden of
current- and future generations moves with
the discount rate, when the growth rate is
assumed to be constant at 1.5%.
12 We note
that the tax burden of current and future
generations is initially strictly decreasing, but
when the discount rate exceeds a certain point
the curves become increasing. To explain this
behaviour, it is necessary to examine the raw
profiles of the base year. We find that between
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Figure 2.
IPL vs. the gr-ratio
12. The discount rate is derived from the gr-ratio using the formula r = (1+0.015)/gr-ratio–1.the ages of 0 and 19 individuals pay negative
amounts to the government, receive net
transfers. Between the ages of 20 and 68,
however, they pay net taxes to the
government. During the remainder of their
lives, they receive net benefits from the
government. Although a larger discount rate
reduces all future amounts, it increases the
weight of payments close in time. Therefore,
it is normal that the curves in Figure 3 decrease
initially. However, because the future tax
payments are so much greater than the initial
transfers, there comes a time when the
increased weight of the initial transfers is not
enough to counteract the reduction in
monetary terms of a higher interest rate. At
that point, the curves start to increase.
We have marked the base case of 6%
discount rate in the figure, along with the
points where the discount rate is 4 and 8%.
The corresponding values for the tax burden
of current- and future generations are
reported in Table 4.
Figure 4 displays how the tax burden of
current- and future generations moves with
the growth rate, when the discount rate is
assumed to be constant at 6%.
13 All the
experiments are ordered by the growth rate.
Initially, there is a large gap between the tax
burden of current and future generations.
However, this occurs for negative growth rates
and is thus perhaps not particularly
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13. The growth rate is derived from the gr-ratio using the formula g = gr-ratio*(1+0.06)–1.
Figure 3.
Current- and Future Generations vs. the Discount Rateinteresting. When the growth rate has
exceeded zero, the tax burden of current and
future generations is not widely separated.
Another point to note is that the tax burden
of future generations reaches a minimum
when the growth rate is zero, while the tax
burden of current generations reaches a
minimum when the growth rate is close to
1.5%. The two curves intersect in one point,
where intergenerational equality is reached. 
We have marked the base case of 1.5%
discount rate in the figure, along with the
points where the growth rate is 1 and 2%.
The corresponding values for the tax burden
of current- and future generations are
reported in Table 4, but it is clear from the
figure that the accounts are not particularly
sensitive over this interval for the growth rate.
We note that Figure 4 is the mirror image
of Figure 3. The explanation as to why the
net tax burden of current- and future
generations are initially decreasing with the
growth rate and then start to increase is
parallel the one given when Figure 3 was
considered. A larger growth rate increases the
weight of future payments. When the growth
rate is small (and even negative), the initial
transfers carry more weight when the lifetime
tax burden is computed. However, when the
growth rate reaches a certain level the
situation is reversed and the curves start to
increase. 
Conclusions
In the 1990s, the Icelandic economy achieved
relative stability after high inflation and
repeated devaluations of earlier decades. The
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Figure 4.
Current- and Future Generations vs. the  Growth Ratelatter part of the decade was a prosperous
period with high GDP growth and from 1997
onwards the budget was run with surpluses. 
This paper employs generational accounts
to examine the impact of the economic
conditions and fiscal policy of recent years on
current- and future generations in Iceland.
We examine the development of the
intergenerational imbalance between 1994
and 1998 in light of fiscal policy and
economic conditions of that period. We find
that the intertemporal public liabilities of the
government decreased every year and in 1998
there are even intertemporal assets. This can
largely be attributed to the business cycle, but
the impact of a restrictive fiscal policy cannot
be ignored. It can even be said that the fiscal
policy of the Icelandic government over this
period headed towards generational equality.
We also examine the effects of imple-
menting a tax for the exploitation of the
Icelandic fishing grounds, using the revenue
to establish a generational fund to cover the
unfounded pension liabilities of the govern-
ment. The result is that the annual tax needed
for that purpose would be unrealistically high,
or between 9.1 and 10.4% of GDP. Such a
policy would increase the intertemporal
public assets of the government according to
the accounts of 1998 and additional cuts in
taxes would be needed to achieve inter-
generational equality.
Finally, we performed a Monte Carlo
analysis to assess the sensitivity of the
generational accounts to changes in the
discount- and growth rate. Such a sensitivity
analysis gives additional information on how
the accounts react to changes in the discount-
and growth rate, as well as being informative
on whether the accounts are particularly
sensitive on any specific intervals for these
parameters.
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